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Abstract 
The aim of the study is to find out the possibility of recovering the tariff revenue that will be lost in the 
process of liberalization through restructuring of the domestic tax system in Nigeria by examining the buoyancy 
and elasticity of the tax system. Using the dummy method, commonly known as the Singer approach, the 
Nigerian tax system as a whole was found to be relatively buoyant but not elastic. The buoyancy however showed 
a decline close to 16% after the 1991 trade reform. Import duty despite the decline in its share in total tax from 
47.3% before the reform to 28% over the reform period showed a positive increase in buoyancy. CIT collection 
measured by tax-to-base elasticity declined by 46% over the reform period, suggesting that there is an urgent 
need to improve on tax administration. Also, the result confirm the ineffectiveness of the various reforms and 
(DTMs) in enhancing the productivity of the tax system, showing that much need to be done in our domestic tax 
system, both in structure and administration before thinking of engaging in any bi- or multilateral trade 
agreement.  
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1.1 Introduction 
Nigeria government in 2003 adopted a new trade policy in line with an overall economic development 
package called the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). NEEDS was 
described as Nigeria’s plan for prosperity and the vision for a greater tomorrow. With the aim to achieve its 
objectives, NEEDS focused on four key strategies: reorienting values, reducing poverty, creating wealth and 
generating employment. These key visionary goals were again built into three major macroeconomic frameworks, 
namely: empowering people, promoting private enterprise and changing the way government does its work 
(NEEDS 2005). 
In the Trade Policy area, NEEDS seeks to deepen Nigeria’s integration with the rest of the world and to 
maximise the benefits of strategic integration (NEEDS 2005). Thus Regional Integration and trade are the two 
instruments identified by NEEDS for maximising the benefits of globalisation. The trade policy objective under 
NEEDS is to gradually liberalise trade and lay a solid foundation for full exploitation of Nigeria’s potentials in 
international trade and helping her to become the gateway to West and Central Africa.  
Against the above background, under NEEDS, the trade policy thrust is to drastically reduce the 
uncertainty and unpredictability of the trade policy regime, harmonise trade practices with those of other 
ECOWAS countries and hence facilitate full integration, respect obligations under multilateral and regional 
trading systems and create a conducive and competitive environment in which Nigerian enterprises can thrive and 
effectively compete in the global and regional economy. 
 
1.2    Problem Statement 
The above NEEDS trade policies are those of trade liberalization which has been a major concern of 
industrialized countries for years now. They have much emphasized the gains from trade liberalization for both 
the developed and the developing countries (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Edwards, 1998; Bhasin, 2006; World 
Bank, 2002; Winters et al., 2004). These were supported by the positive impact of trade liberalisation on 
Government revenue found by Inye, (2005), Baunsgaard and Keen, (2004) and, Wacziarg and Welch (2003). 
The World trade Organization estimates that the elimination of tariff would result in developing countries’ 
income gain of   $500 billion and would lift more than 200 million people out of poverty by 2015 (WTO 
Addendum, April 2003).  These tends to lure developing countries into trade agreements with each other and with 
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the developed countries as exemplified by ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET), which targets 
establishment of common external tariff of 5%, 10% and 20% among the ECOWAS countries, Union 
Economique et monetaire Quest Africaine (UEOMAO), Which targets a tariff rate that is 35% less than the 
Nigerian average tariff rate, EU- ACP countries partnership agreement, which aims at preferential trade policy 
and establishment of the same tariff rate among EU and ACP countries (Kuji, 2002). 
Despite all the emphasized gains from trade liberalization, Stevens and Kennan (2005a and b), Stephen 
(2005c) and Rodriguez, et al. (2001), are of the opinion that if African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries 
should reduce their tariff on import from EU, it will have potential ‘revenue’ and ‘competition’ effect. This 
according to them may not be in favour of the developing countries. In Nigeria, it has been found that trade 
liberalization has been negatively correlated with growth of the GDP (Nwafor, 2004). Kola-Ige, (2006) shows 
that a policy of harmonizing tariffs to the common external tariff of the European community has virtually no 
effect on welfare. Nwafor, Ogujiuba and Adenikinju (2005) found that despite oil revenue, adopting CET tariff 
band will reduce poverty in the urban area in the short and the long run, but will increase poverty in the rural 
areas in both the short and long run, thereby increasing income inequality in Nigeria. In support of this, Banerjee 
and Newman found that even if global economic integration induces faster economic growth in the long run and 
substantial reductions in poverty, the adjustment might be costly, with the burden falling disproportionately on 
the poor (Banerjee and Newman, 2004). These therefore, signify that Nigeria and most of the developing 
countries may not be reaping the benefit of trade liberalization as the developed countries and the WTO 
emphasized.  
The possible cause of this negative relationship between trade liberalization and Economic growth may 
be the fact that trade liberalization results in decreased fiscal revenue of the government which reduces public 
savings (Bhasin 2006). The work of African trade Policy Centre (ATPC) shows that negative fiscal impacts 
emerge at later stages of liberalization. The boost of revenues from higher trade volumes as a result of tariff cuts 
is insufficient to outweigh the revenue-damping effect of the tax reductions (ATPC, 2004). Bhasin also noted that 
developing countries may not choose to liberalize their trade despite the potential gains because of two important 
considerations; the loss in revenue due to tariff reduction and the potential economic and social disruption caused 
by rapid displacement of workers from agriculture. The World Trade Organization in its 11 April 2003 
Addendum stated that for many developing countries, tariffs have been an important source of government 
revenue and the elimination of tariffs could have serious consequences for their fiscal stability. It was further 
stressed there that, genuine trade liberalization must nevertheless, eventually result in reduced tax revenue and 
hence, will raise difficult fiscal issues if appropriate steps are not taken to strengthen the domestic tax system 
(WTO Addendum, April 2003). Nigerians should be more concerned to this issue. Our tariff is among the highest 
world wide, ranging from 2.5-150% as at 2004 and reducing it to 0-20% as demanded by the ECOWAS, for 
example, will mean a heavy loss in revenue. These coupled with the fact that Nigerians is a mono product 
economy and has preference for imported products makes the question of whether Nigerian government actually 
recovers revenue lost from tariff reduction a very important one. 
Earlier research works revealed that the lost revenue from trade liberalization could be compensated for 
if appropriate fiscal reforms are taken in the concerned economy. From the findings of WTO and Liam et al., 
(1999), the revenue effect of trade liberalization can be mitigated by building on the domestic tax reforms. The 
decreased public savings could also be compensated for by an increase in foreign savings (Bhasin 2004), and by 
expanding the volume of import and export (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2004).   
Among all these means of compensating for the loss in revenue as a result of trade liberalization, the 
most likely one for Nigeria as a mono product economy is that of reforming the domestic tax system. However, it 
was noted that the ability of the tax system to mobilize sufficient revenue depends on its buoyancy and elasticity 
(Ademola, 1997; Asher, 1989; Kabbashi, 2005; and Daniel et al., 2010). Therefore, the question of how buoyant 
and elastic the domestic tax system is becomes necessary in determining to what extent the Nigerian government 
recovers her lost tax revenue from trade liberalisation. 
The aim of the study is therefore is to determine the buoyancy and elastic the domestic tax system as a 
way of predicting the revenue implication of trade liberalization in Nigeria . 
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2.0 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Tax Buoyancy and elasticity measures increases in tax revenue due to increase in income (Osoro, 1993); 
Ademola, 1997; BILQUEES 2004; Kabbashi, 2005; and Daniel et al., 2010). When no attempt is made to control 
for discretionary measures that alter the tax rate and/or base, then the responsiveness of tax revenue to change in 
income is the tax buoyancy. Controlling for such measures yields estimates of tax elasticity. Buoyancy greater 
than elasticity suggests that discretionary tax measures (DTMs) improve revenue mobilization of the tax, while 
buoyancy less than elasticity implies that revenue mobilization worsen as a result of the introduction of the 
DTMs. 
The discretionary tax measures (DTMs) are under the control of the policy makers, generally these are 
due to changes in tax rate, base definition as well as changes in collection and enforcements of tax law. While 
non-discretionary changes are due to the natural growth of the economy. The global buoyancy of a tax system is 
usually measured by the proportional change in total tax revenue with respect to the proportional change in 
national income. 
 According to Gujarati (2006), Kabbashi (2005), Osoro (1995) and Ademola (1997), a good way of 
estimating the buoyancy and elasticity is by the use of exponential model of the form:  
  tT Y
βα ε=  ………………………………………… (1) 
Where T is the tax revenue and Y is the national Income. Equation (1) can be transformed into 
double log form following fixed-effect model:  
    ttt LogYLogTLog εβα ++=
ˆˆˆ …………………. (2) 
Here, βˆ  is the OLS estimate of buoyancy (or elasticity), αˆ   is a constant term indicating tax 
yield when the base is set to zero (Osoro 1993; Ariyo 1997; Teera 2002; Tanzi, 2003; and Jha 
2004).  
Two techniques are in use for cleansing data in order to control for the impact of the 
discretionary tax measures DTMs and hence obtains estimates of tax elasticity. These are the 
historical time series tax data (HTSTD) adjusted for DTMs (Mansfield, 1972; Sury, 1985 and 
Osoro, 1993) and the unadjusted HTSTD with time trends or dummy variables introduced as 
proxies for DTMs (Andersen, 1973; Choudhry, 1975; Singer, 1968; and Artus, 1974). In this 
study, the dummy method, commonly known as the Singer approach was used, thereby 
changing equation (2) to: 
 
3
1 2 1 3 4
1
垐 ?ˆ logt t t i i t
i
LogT Log LogY Y D trendα β β β β ε−
=
= + + + + +∑ ………………………… (3) 
where Di stands for three dummies, Yt-1 stands for one period lag of GDP.  
The two-step dummies are introduced to account for the tax reforms in Nigeria within the period of analysis. The 
first reform took palace in 1991 and the second reform in 2002 (Ayodele, 2006). One slope dummy was 
introduced to allow for change in the slope of the tax revenue function over the trade liberalization period. The 
expectation is that over this period not only the intercept but also the slope of the function may change. The trend 
term is included to account for innovation in the Nigerian tax system as a result of the numerous changes in tax 
measures introduced over the sample period. Finally the lagged base is introduced to account for the 
administrative efficiency, or otherwise, in tax collection.  
Models (2) and (3) will be applied to the total tax revenue (TTR) and its disaggregated sources 
(Personal Income Tax (PIT), Corporate Income tax (CIT), Import Duties(IM.D),  Excise Duties(ED ), Indirect 
Tax(IND.T), and Direct Tax(Dir. T)) in order to get estimates, respectively of tax buoyancies and elasticities.  
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3.0 Empirical Results  
3.1 Buoyancy 
Table 1 contains the estimated results for the buoyancy of the taxes in Nigeria. The buoyancy coefficients for 
total tax revenue (TTR) and Personal income tax (PIT) are1.1 and 1.2 respectively, which show that they are 
generally buoyant. These results are comparable with those obtained from other similar country studies (see e. g. 
Osoro, 1993; and Muriiti, 2003;).Those of Import duty, Excise duty, and CIT are all less than one, showing that 
these taxes are not buoyant. The low buoyancy on international trade might be due to tax evasion, tax 
exemptions, corruption in tax administration, and the presence of the underground economy.  
In order to compare the performance of the tax system before and after liberalization, nominal estimates 
of the intercept and the coefficients for different taxes over 1970-91 and 1992-2010 were reported in tables (2). 
As seen, the buoyancy of the TTR showed a decline close to 16% after the reform where as Import duty despite 
the decline in its share in total tax from 47.3% before the reform to 28% over the reform period showed a 
positive increase in buoyancy.  
The decomposed buoyancies can be used to investigate the sources of loopholes in revenue leakages. 
Table (3) presents a summary of decomposed nominal measures of buoyancies of the major tax sources. The 
highest growth of base-to income occurs in the case of Corporate Income Tax indicating a high growth of taxable 
business profit. However, Corporate Income Tax collections, measured by tax-to-base elasticity, declined by 46% 
over the reform period suggesting that there is an urgent need to improve the administration of collection of this 
tax. 
  
3.2 Elasticity 
Nominal estimates of the elasticities of the major taxes and of total tax revenue using Singer’s approach are 
shown in table (4). As seen in the table the overall elasticity is 0.82, while the elasticities of individual taxes were 
divergent. The elasticity of import duties, the main non oil tax in the country, was 0.83. Excise tax has an 
elasticity of 0.82, while both income and profit tax had respectively elasticities of 1.26 and 1.57. 
The overall tax elasticity of 0.82 implies that the growth of tax yield in proportion to the nominal growth 
of the economy is low. The elasticities of the income and profit taxes were greater than unity. However, the 
lagged base is negative implying that there were substantial administrative inefficiencies in the collection of these 
taxes.  
The liberalization dummy was significant only for Income Tax. However the slope shift dummy was 
significantly positive making it difficult to assess the impact of liberalization on tax yield from this source. These 
two coefficients were not significant for the other tax handles indicating that liberalization don’t have much effect 
on these revenue sources. The dummy for tax reform over 1991/92 was significantly negative for income and 
profit taxes. The negative sign on this variable for these and other taxes reflects the effects of the confusion 
created in the tax system resulting from the replacement of the conventional tax handles with new ones.   
   The trend coefficient was significantly negative for excise tax implying that the various reforms and 
innovations in the tax system failed to raise revenue from this tax source. This coefficient picked up the declining 
trend of the excise tax resulting from weak administration and the various tax exemptions schemes introduced to 
encourage local production and import-substituting industrialization. 
Table (5) provides a summary of estimated values of the constants and coefficients for buoyancy and 
elasticity using nominal variables over the sample. As seen in the table, the difference between the estimated 
coefficients of the overall buoyancy and elasticity is positive and relatively large. However, the values of 
estimated constants move in different directions over the sample making it difficult to confirm that the various 
discretionary tax changes improve tax yield. The same observation applies to the excise duties. In contrast, for 
the personal income and business taxes the difference between buoyancy and elasticity were large and significant, 
and since the values of estimated constants move in the same direction it can be concluded that the various 
(DTMs) appear not to improve tax yields from these sources. In the case of import duties the values of estimated 
constants and coefficients move in the same direction implying that for any one percent increase in GDP the 
discretionary tax changes mobilize an additional 0.04 percent of revenues from import duties.  
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Table (6) shows a summary of the estimates of real measures of buoyancy and elasticity. Despite the 
statistical insignificance of many estimated coefficients, the reported results parallel the earlier ones and confirm 
the ineffectiveness of the various reforms and (DTMs) in enhancing the productivity of the tax system. The 
significant and relatively high estimates of real measure of the excise duties indicate that the composition of total 
tax is skewed away from trade and income taxes towards domestic indirect tax. 
The less buoyant and inelastic tax system, provide an explanation for the low tax efforts, which in turn 
implies negligence of the productive sectors of the economy. There is a considerable danger that, the rise in 
windfalls associated with the boom in oil sector, may provide lack of incentive to develop alternative tax bases 
and/or improve the existing ones, with the obvious result of reducing public accountability, inducing destructive 
rent seeking activities and an efficient allocation of the resources in the economy. 
 
4. Conclusion and Recommendation 
There has been and increasing pressure from the developed world for the developing nations to 
liberalize their trade with highlights of the gain from trade liberalization. These lead to series of research to find 
out, if actually the developing countries will benefit both in the short and long run from the action. Most of the 
results indicated that the ability of the developing countries to benefit from trade liberalization depends on 
whether it can recover the tariff revenues it will loss from liberalization. Among the identified means of doing 
this, that of restructuring the domestic tax system was found more applicable to Nigeria. 
This work therefore seek to find out the possibility of restructuring the domestic tax system in Nigeria 
by examining the buoyancy and elasticity of the tax system using the dummy method, commonly known as the 
Singer approach. 
  The Nigerian tax system as a whole was found to be relatively buoyant but not elastic. The buoyancy of the 
TTR showed a decline close to 16% after the reform where as Import duty despite the decline in its share in total 
tax from 47.3% before the reform to 28% over the reform period showed a positive increase in buoyancy. CIT 
collection measured by tax-to-base elasticity declined by 46% over the reform period, suggesting that there is an 
urgent need to improve on the tax administration. Also, the result confirm the ineffectiveness of the various 
reforms and (DTMs) in enhancing the productivity of the tax system. 
From the findings of this work, it is clear that much need to be done in our domestic tax system, both in 
structure and administration for according to Osoro, (1995), reforms in tax structure that is not accompanied by 
administrative reforms is bound to be useless. It is therefore recommended that the immediate policy objectives 
of the Nigerian government before thinking of engaging in any bi- or multilateral trade agreement should be on 
restructuring the domestic tax system by diversifying the tax base and improving the tax administration system. 
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Appendix A 
Table (1):  
 Constant Coefficient S.E. t-value  R
2
 D.W P-value 
Total tax revenue -3.9378 1.1028 0.0482 22.858 0.9389 2.18 0.0000 
Personal Income Tax -4.0316 1.2123 0.7935 1.528 0.9040 1.68 0.1367 
CIT -7.1112 0.7714 0.6025 1.280 0.9505 1.93 0.2099 
Import duties -3.9327 0.5446 0.2205 2.469 0.9907 1.43 0.0190 
Excise tax -3.0572 0.9578 0.2339 4.0949 0.9994 2.01 0.0000 
Estimates of tax buoyancy in Nigeria 1970-2010 
 
 
 
Table (2):  
Comparison of Tax buoyancies over 1970-91 and 1992-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 1970-1991 1992-2010 Difference in 
coefficient 
Constant Coefficient Constant Coefficient 
Total Tax 
Revenue 
-1.1825 0.8814 1.5425 0.7418 -0.1396 
Personal Income 
Tax 
-3.3506 1.002 -0.3766 0.6742 -0.3278 
CIT -4.1117 0.9670 -3.1000 0.7320 -0.235 
Import Duties -1.9753 0.9474 -3.224 1.0023 0.0549 
Excise Tax -3.5590 0.8690 -1.5144 0.6893 -0.1797 
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Table (3):   
Period 1970-1991 1992-2010 Difference 
                                              (A)  Base-to-Income Elasticity 
Personal Income Tax 0.8220 0.8778 0.0518 
CIT 0.8997 1.3890 0.04893 
Import Duties 1.0020 0.8660 -0.136 
Excise Tax 0.9801 0.7721 -0.2081 
                                                  (B)  Tax-to-Base Elasticity 
Personal Income Tax 0.6357 0.4442 -0.1915 
CIT 1.0377 0.6003 -0.4374 
Import Duties 0.3205 1.0281 0.7076 
Excise Tax 0.8774 0.7111 -0.1663 
The decomposition of Buoyancy over the reform and Pre-reform periods 
 
Table (4):  
Equation Constant Coefficient Lib. 
Dummy 
Slope 
Dummy 
1991/92-
reform 
Dummy 
Trend Lagged 
Base 
TTR -.069 
(-.061) 
0.82 
(3.21) 
1.8 
(0.93) 
-0.09 
(-0.51) 
0.12 
(0.63) 
0.002 
(0.09) 
0.014 
(.05) 
PIT 0.21 
(0.20) 
1.26 
(3.01) 
-3.89 
(-3.07) 
0.61 
(3.83) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.23 
(4.31) 
-1.22 
(-3.37) 
CIT -3.14 
(-1.50) 
1.57 
(3.54) 
4.30 
(1.13) 
-0.32 
(-0.84) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.52) 
-0.77 
(-1.82) 
IM.D -1.89 
(-2.34) 
0.83 
(4.98) 
-0.46 
(-0.48) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.16 
(-1.25) 
0.04 
(1.25) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
ED -3.29 
(-2.19) 
0.82 
(2.75) 
1.03 
(0.58) 
-.01 
(-0.1) 
0.49 
(1.98) 
-0.13 
(-2.19) 
0.27 
(0.85) 
IND.T -0.44 
(-0.52) 
0.67 
(3.55) 
0.21 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.8) 
0.22 
(2.16) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
0.10 
(0.47) 
DIR. T -1.56 
(-0.61) 
1.33 
(2.57) 
1.74 
(0.38) 
-.06 
(-0.31) 
-0.24 
(-0.87) 
0.12 
(1.04) 
-.076 
(-1.45) 
Estimates of Tax Elasticity in Nigeria 1970-2010 
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Table (5):  
 Buoyancy Elasticity Difference in 
Coefficients 
Equation Constant Coefficient Constant Coefficient 
Total Tax 
Revenue 
-1.33 0.92 -0.07 0.82 +0.10 
Personal 
Income Tax 
-4.16 0.95 0.21 1.26 -0.31 
Business 
Profit Tax 
-3.88 0.96 -3.14 1.57 -0.61 
Import Duties -1.70 0.87 -1.89 0.83 +0.04 
Excise Tax -3.65 0.92 -3.29 0.82 +0.10 
 Comparison of Nominal measures of Tax buoyancy and Elasticity Over 1970-2010 
 
 
Table (6):  
 Buoyancy Elasticity Difference in 
Coefficients 
Equation Constant Coefficient Constant Coefficient 
Total Tax 
Revenue 
2.95 0.25 4.33 0.52 -0.27 
Personal 
Income Tax 
3.03 -0.18 4.16 0.02 -0.2 
Business 
Profit Tax 
2.59 0.02 5.25 0.58 - 0.56 
Import Duties 2.72 0.16 2.62 0.13 +0.03 
Excise Tax -2.95 0.82 -1.28 0.66 +0.16 
Comparison of real measures of Tax buoyancy and Elasticity Over 1970-2010 
 
